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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final order of the Utah Labor Commission. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2801(8)(a); 63G-4-403(l); and 78A-4-103(2)(a). Petitioners have exhausted all
administrative remedies available at law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4401.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE ONE
Whether the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission
committed reversible clear error when impermissibly inferring that Respondent
wanted the coccyx surgery (and prematurely ordering temporary disability
benefits when Respondent is refusing to undergo the coccyx surgery upon
request).
Standard of review: The application of law by the Labor Commission
should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the Labor
Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App 1998).
ISSUE TWO
Whether the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Facts, Conclusions
of Law, and Order should be vacated because the ALJ's decision is not
supported by sufficient evidence and the findings of fact are inadequate.
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Standard of Review: The determination of the Labor Commission
should be set aside as an abuse of discretion if it "exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality." Hymas v. Labor Comm 'n, 996 P.2d 1072
(Utah App. 2008).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, RULES, OR
CONSTITUTIONS
ISSUE ONE
Utah Code Ann. 63G-4-403(4)(d);
UtahR.Civ.P. 60(b)(l),(6);
ISSUE TWO
Utah Code Ann. 63G-4-403(4)(d);
UtahR.Civ.P. 60(b)(l),(6);
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 16, 2007, Respondent filed an Application for Hearing on the
issues of medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total
disability compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and
interest. (R. 1). Petitioners filed their answer on September 21, 2007. (R. 1319). On June 5, 2008, a hearing was held on Respondent's application for
hearing.
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• After the hearing, r-c ^: requested a medical panel which provided
opinions on how to handle the medical disputes on ihe ease

The medical panel

found that Respondent's right knee condition was not work related, bi it found
medical causation for the bilateral ankles, feet, great right toe, and coccyx
conditions I he medical panel further found that the bilateral ankles, feet, and
great right lot1 v\ ere medically stable as of February 17, 2007. The medical
panel also stated as follows:
"[I]f Ms. Hartley does undergo a coccygectomy as suggested by Dr.
Bean, I would not anticipate her reaching a point of Maximum Medical
Improvement [stabilization] of her coccygeal status until approximately 6
months after the contemplative coccygectomy is undertaken. If Ms.
Hartley does not wish to undergo that surgical procedure, it is my
opinion that she would have reached a point of medical stability ... one
year after her date of injury, that being on and/or about 07/17/07" (R.
75).
On February 26, 2009, Administrative Law hiu^ Lorrie Lima issued her
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ordei I R 77 87 ). The Al J ordered
Petitioners to pay TPD benefits from July 17, 2006 to August 2f>. 20iib and
TTD benefits from August 27, 2006 to October 23, 2006 (during the periods
when claimant had reduced hours or between jobs). (R. 85). The ALJ also
inferred that Respondent had elected the coccyx surgery, as evidenced by her
pursuit of litigation and medical treatment, and therefore she was not at MMI.
(R. 84-85).
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Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission
on March 305 2009. (R. 88-90). The Labor Commission issued its order on
April 26, 2011 and denied Petitioners' argument that any award of TTD
benefits was premature and sua sponte (and without support) may have
potentially ordered additional benefits to be paid in the interim. Specifically,
the Labor Commission generally indicated that Respondent was entitled to
"temporary disability compensation until she reaches medical stability after the
surgery." (R. 93-96). The ALJ had not provided such an award in her Order
probably due to the fact that there was uncertainty as to whether the petitioner
would undergo the coccyx surgery.
Petitioners timely filed a Petition for Review to the Utah Court of
Appeals on May 25, 2011, for review, of the entire Order of the Commission.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Respondent alleged an injury to her right foot, knees, hip, thighs, chest,
tailbone, low and mid back and across her arms as a result of an alleged
industrial injury on July 17, 2006. (R. 78). This matter then came before the
Labor Commission at a hearing on June 5, 2008. The ALJ referred the medical
aspects of this case to a medical panel, chaired by Dr. Alan Goldman, with the
medical panel report issued on November 21, 2008. (R. 70-76). The ALJ issued
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her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on February 26, 2009. (R.
77-87).
The ALJ found that Respondent's right knee condition was not work
related, but found medical causation for the bilateral ankles, feet, great right toe,
and coccyx conditions. (R. 83-84). The ALJ further found that the bilateral
ankles, feet, and great right toe were medically stable as of February 17, 2007 in
accordance with the findings of the medical panel. (R. 84).
The ALJ adopted the medical panel's findings that further medical
treatment, including a coccygectomy, may be reasonable and necessary to treat
this industrial injury. Specifically, the medical panel had found as follows with
regard to this issue:
"[I]f Ms. Hartley does undergo a coccygectomy as suggested by
Dr. Bean, I would not anticipate her reaching a point of Maximum
Medical Improvement [stabilization] of her coccygeal status until
approximately 6 months after the contemplative coccygectomy is
undertaken. If Ms. Hartley does not wish to undergo that
surgical procedure, it is my opinion that she would have reached
a point of medical stability ... one year after her date of injury,
that being on and/or about 07/17/07r (R. 75).
The ALJ ultimately inferred that Respondents has sought to have the
coccygectomy by generally pursuing medical treatment and litigation and,
therefore, was not at MMI. (R. 84). Accordingly, the ALJ found that
Respondent is not at MMI and ordered the Petitioners to pay ongoing temporary
disability payments from February 24, 2007 to October 29, 2007. (R. 85). The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ALJ, however, did not order the ongoing payment of TTD benefits probably in
part because Respondent had not formally agreed to proceed with the
coccygectomy.
The Commission agreed with the ALJ and determined that the
coccygectomy was necessary to treat the work injury and, therefore,
Respondent was entitled to benefits even though her condition was stable with
regard to everything but the coccyx surgery in July, 2007. (R. 94-95). The
Labor Commission agreed with the ALJ and sua sponte may have ordered
additional temporary disability benefits to be paid in the interim. Specifically,
the Labor Commission generally ordered respondents to pay for ongoing TTD
benefits (which the ALJ did NOT order) without any explanation on this issue.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law,
and Order and the Utah Labor Commission's Order should be vacated because
the decisions are not supported by sufficient evidence and the findings of fact
are inadequate. The ALJ committed reversible clear error when she inferred
that Respondent wanted the coccyx surgery and prematurely ordered benefits
when Respondent had not yet undergone the surgery or agreed to undergo the
surgery. Further, the Labor Commission failed to address the fact that
Respondent has still not specifically agreed to proceed with the surgery upon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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request. Moreover, the Labor Commission indicated that Petitioners need to
pay ongoing temporary disability benefits (when the ALJ refused to order
ongoing benefits) even though Respondent still has not agreed to proceed with
the surgery.
ARGUMENT
The Administrative Law Judge committed reversible clear error where
she prematurely ordered benefits when Respondent had not yet undergone the
surgery. Respondent's condition was medically stable as of July 17, 2007 as to
all conditions but the coccyx surgery. As a result of this stabilization,
Respondent is not entitled to additional temporary disability benefits until she
decides to pursue surgery. If and when she decides to pursue surgery, she may
become entitled to additional compensation benefits. However, in the interim,
Respondent should not be awarded additional benefits because she decided to
delay pursuit of surgery. Such a determination by this Court would allow
Respondent to wait and delay treatment simply to gain additional benefits.
Once a determination of stabilization has been made, temporary benefits should
cease and only be reopened once an event has occurred which alters this
determination of stabilization.
This case came before the Labor Commission at a hearing on June 5,
2008. The ALJ referred the medical aspects of this case to a medical panel,
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

chaired by Dr. Alan Goldman, with the medical panel report issued on
November 21, 2008. The ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order on February 26, 2009.
The ALJ found that Respondent's right knee condition was not work
related, but found medical causation for the bilateral ankles, feet, great right toe,
and coccyx conditions. The ALJ further found that the bilateral ankles, feet,
and great right toe were medically stable as of February 17, 2007 in accordance
with the findings of the medical panel.
The ALJ adopted the medical panel's findings that further medical
treatment, including a coccygectomy, may be reasonable and necessary to treat
this industrial injury. Specifically, the medical panel found as follows:
"[I]f Ms. Hartley does undergo a coccygectomy as suggested by Dr.
Bean, I would not anticipate her reaching a point of Maximum Medical
Improvement [stabilization] of her coccygeal status until approximately 6
months after the contemplative coccygectomy is undertaken. If Ms.
Hartley does not wish to undergo that surgical procedure, it is my
opinion that she would have reached a point of medical stability ... one
year after her date of injury, that being on and/or about 07/17/07."
The ALJ implicitly inferred that Respondent had, by generally pursing
the claim and medical treatment, sought to have the coccygectomy and,
therefore, was not at MMI. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Respondent is not
at MMI and ordered respondents to pay ongoing temporary disability payments
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from February 24, 2007 to October 29, 2007, the day she began work with a
new employer.
Petitioners argue that the ALJ's order regarding benefits paid after July
17, 2007 is premature. Specifically, Respondent has not yet undergone the
surgery so it is premature to assume that the surgery will take place. If
Respondent fails to proceed with the surgery, she was found to have reached
MMI by July 17, 2007. Any benefits awarded by the ALJ after this date,
therefore, is premature until the surgery takes place. Specifically, the Utah
Court of Appeals has held that temporary disability benefits are intended to
provide an employee with benefits during the time she recuperates from a work
injury and should terminate at stabilization. Griffith v. Industrial Comm 'n of
Utah 754 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Stabilization has been defined
as a factual question to be determined by the medical evidence in the record.
M a t 984.
Respondent was found to be at MMI on July 17, 2007 until the surgery
takes place. If she decides to pursue surgery, then her temporary disability
benefits may resume. However, in the interim she should not be awarded
benefits since her work related injury was found to have stabilized.
The ALJ impermissibly presumed or inferred that Respondent wanted the
coccyx surgery. In fact, she has refused to proceed with the surgery despite
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inquiries from respondents. This is the problem with the ALJ's order. She
presumed that the Respondent may want surgery based on filing the claim and
generally pursuing medical treatment instead of direct evidence on the issue.
This error has been potentially compounded by the Labor Commission.
Even though the ALJ did not order ongoing TTD benefits (there was an end
date provided), the Labor Commission made a open ended statement that
Respondent is entitled to "temporary disability compensation until she reaches
medical stability after the surgery." If this is somehow considered an additional
finding, it expands the benefits awarded by the ALJ (as the ALJ only awarded
closed ended benefits). This new potential finding by the Labor Commission
constitutes an error of law.

Petitioners contend that petitioner was at MMI as of July 17, 2007, and
should not have been found eligible for temporary disability benefits after that
date. Petitioners further argue that any alleged increase in benefits awarded by
the Labor Commission is impermissible. The Labor Commission should not be
permitted to sua sponte order an increase in benefits to be paid in the interim
(and it is not clear that this is what the Labor Commission did anyway). If the
Labor Commission believed that additional benefits should have been awarded,
the matter should have been remanded to the ALJ or there should have been
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direct evidence that the petitioner will proceed with the surgery. Again,
Respondent has refused to proceed with the surgery and instead is trying to
obtain additional temporary disability benefits (that were not ordered by the
ALJ) even though she has refused to proceed with the possible surgery.
Petitioners argue that this matter should be remanded so the ALJ can
amend her findings, conclusions, and orders to find Respondent at MMI as of
July 17, 2007 and, if petitioner elects to undergo the coccygectomy, Respondent
would be entitled to further temporary disability benefits only after the surgery
takes place. The other option would be to affirm the ALJ's order with the end
date for TTD already provided (without including the additional time frame of
temporary disability benefits potentially discussed by the Labor Commission)
and then Respondent can refile for hearing if she actually wants to the coccyx
surgery.
In any case, it is unacceptable that the Labor Commission has discussed
the possibility of ongoing temporary disability benefits which were not awarded
by the ALJ (especially when the Respondent has not agreed to proceed with the
disputed surgery). Respondent did not appeal the ALJ's order so.it would be
impermissible to consider a possible increase in the award provided by the ALJ.
In addition, the Labor Commission only affirmed the ALJ's Order so there
should not be any additional benefits awarded. If Respondent wants additional
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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temporary disability benefits that were not awarded by the ALJ, she would need
to refile for hearing.
Petitioners also allege that the order is generally not supported by
applicable law or substantial evidence. Petitioners argue that the order must be
overturned with regard to the award of any additional temporary disability
benefits and medical benefits on this case.
Petitioners respectfully request that this matter be remanded and the ALJ
be instructed to enter a Supplementary Order amending her prior Findings of
Fact, Conclusions or Law, and Order to find petitioner at MMI as of July 17,
2007, strike the order of temporary disability benefits from July 17, 2007 to
October 29, 2007, and order farther temporary disability benefits only if
petitioner actually undergoes the coccygectomy. Petitioners also request that
the order be clarified in that the Labor Commission should not have awarded
any additional temporary disability benefits or medical benefits. Ultimately,
either the matter needs to be remanded or ongoing temporary disability benefits
should not be awarded until Respondent agrees to proceed with the surgery.
Petitioners, therefore, ask for one of the two following remedies to
address this issue:
*

The matter should be remanded to the ALJ so that she will
reach a supported factual determination on whether Respondent
wants the coccyx surgery instead of impermissibly inferring this
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fact (with a full explanation of any ongoing temporary disability
benefits that are due); or, at a minimum
*

The Labor Commission's appellate review should not be accepted
as an expansion of temporary disability benefits to Respondent
which were not awarded by the ALJ — the Labor Commission's
Order should only be viewed as affirming the award of benefits
provided by the ALJ instead of expanding any benefits (as
Respondent did not even appeal the Order and the potential
expansion of benefits is not clear in the Order or justified due to
the impermissible inference regarding the surgery);

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse
the final order of the Labor Commission, below as an abuse of discretion, not
legally supported, arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by substantial
evidence, and remand for such other proceedings as necessary.
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Dated this y

day of April, 2012.
THOMAS POLLART & MILLER LLC

Brad J. MillW^tf4 ?J8
Attorneysyfor Respondents Waste
Mangement
andl
Idemnity
Insurance of North America
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ADDENDUM
A.

Reproduction of opinion, memorandum decision, findings of fact,
conclusions of law, orders, jury instructions.
None.

B.

Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance such as
contracts or other documents.
None.

C.

Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv): "The appellate court shall grant

relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: the agency
action is: (i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; (ii) contrary
to a rule of the agency; (iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or (iv) otherwise arbitraiy or capricious."
Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(1): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance ofjustice relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;. . .."
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Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(6): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g): "(4) The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: . . . ( g ) the agency
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is
not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court; . . . ."
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction: "(1) The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process
necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who
are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
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(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.,?
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the attached PETITIONERS' BRIEF was served upon
the party(ies) listed below by mailing it by first class mail, personal deliver, or
fax to the following address(es):
Utah Court of Appeals
Appellate Clerks' Office
450 South State, Fifth Floor
PO Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-023

Michael Belnap, Esq.
2610 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

Utah Labor Commission
Adjudication Division
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615

Sent Via:
Mail (postage prepaid)
X Personal Delivery
Fax #801-578-3999
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X Personal Delivery
Fax #801-399-4033
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Personal Delivery
X Fax #801-328-9019
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